In a 30 January release, the European Space Agency announced that it had appointed Laurent Jaffart as the head of the agency’s newly formed Resilience, Navigation, and Connectivity Directorate. The agency explained that the new directorate will be tasked with “bolstering resilience and enhancing navigation and connectivity in line with the security and defence priorities of its Member States, the European Union, and defence-related agencies in Europe.” At first glance, this appears to run counter to Article II of the agency’s founding Convention.
SOURCE: Europe in Space Blog by Andrew Parsonson
Article II states that “the purpose of the Agency shall be to provide for and to promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, cooperation among European States in space research and technology and their space applications, with a view to their being used for scientific purposes and for operational space applications.” The importance of the agency’s activities being “exclusively peaceful” was also underscored by the Convention’s authors, as it is repeated twice in the preamble to the articles.
ESA appears to be aware that the stated responsibilities of its new Resilience, Navigation, and Connectivity Directorate may be interpreted as rubbing up against the obligations set out in Article II. In its 30 January announcement, the agency states that the new directorate will assist in developing space technologies and systems, including for security and defence, on behalf of its Member and Participating States as well as for the European Union “in compliance with the peaceful use of our outer space and the Convention.” In effect, ESA frames its role as developing and implementing capabilities at the request of governments, while maintaining that such activities remain consistent with the Convention, even when they support security or defence applications.
To understand how the agency addresses this apparent contradiction, it is important to examine how ESA defines “exclusively peaceful” and how the term is interpreted more broadly in international law.
A definition by consensus?
A text like the ESA Convention may read like a statement of fixed ideals, but in practice, it functions as a living legal framework. Its boundaries are defined less by the rigid dictionary definition of its words and more by how it is interpreted at any one time by the states that fund the agency. As geopolitical needs shift, so too does the consensus on what constitutes a “peaceful purpose.”
When asked by European Spaceflight, ESA said it interprets the term “exclusively peaceful purposes” as prohibiting only activities that are strictly aggressive in nature.
“The term ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ in Article II of the ESA Convention has consistently been interpreted by ESA and its Member States in accordance with relevant international law, including the UN Charter and the Outer Space Treaty,” ESA explained. “Under this interpretation, the term prohibits aggressive activities that threaten or breach the peace. International law does not prohibit dual- or multiple-use activities as such. Consequently, it does not restrict ESA’s ability to develop essential security and defence technologies in line with the needs of its Member States.”
The agency’s interpretation of the term is supported by legal experts. Sarah Madden, a space lawyer at the London-based law firm Winckworth Sherwood, explained to European Spaceflight how the term “peaceful” can be, and increasingly is, interpreted by ESA.
“‘Peaceful purposes’ can be construed in two ways. It can be construed narrowly as meaning non-military purposes or more broadly as meaning anything that is not aggressive or hostile. The broader interpretation would mean that ‘peaceful purposes’ includes military purposes, provided that the military purposes are of a defensive nature.”
“In its early years, ESA did not involve itself in security or defence. However, over the last at least 20 years, ESA has construed ‘peaceful purposes’ to mean that it can be involved in military and security activities, which it has consistently interpreted to include security and defence purposes, an interpretation which is supported by member states, national space agencies, and most international organisations. ESA programmes, some of which have included defence or security aspects, are voted on by member states, which demonstrates that the member states are also comfortable with this broader interpretation of ‘peaceful purposes’.”
ESA is, as a result, on steady legal ground when pursuing projects that may not appear strictly peaceful. Additionally, as ESA operates on behalf of its Member States, it can act in accordance with any interpretation of “exclusively peaceful” defined by their collective consensus.
The unintended consequences of blurred lines
Against a backdrop of a broader geopolitical reality, the need for ESA’s interpretation of “exclusively peaceful” is understandable. In a world where adversaries are bolder than ever and allies less reliable than ever, a robust European defence industry is essential. Thus, the era of dual-use priorities in space spending is well underway. That reality is undeniable and inescapable. It is, however, important to assess how an increased focus on defence applications could affect both the prioritisation of programmes with limited dual-use potential and the extent to which European space infrastructure may be targeted.
ESA has nine primary programmes: Science, Exploration, Earth Observation, Navigation, Connectivity and Secure Communications, Space Safety, Commercialisation, Space Transportation, and Technology. Of those nine, only Science and Exploration offer very little, if any, dual-use potential.
When it comes to spending on the Agency’s Science Programme, funding is guaranteed. The programme is part of ESA Member States’ mandatory contributions, which are calculated largely on the basis of national income. The same can not be said for Exploration, which is a voluntary programme, with contributions to its missions coming from Member States based on their priorities and the likelihood that those missions will benefit their own industry through ESA contracts.
In November 2025, ESA Member States gathered at the agency’s Ministerial Council meeting to agree on funding for the next three years. Many programmes, particularly those with dual-use potential, saw significant oversubscriptions, including ESA’s new European Resilience from Space Earth observation element, part of a broader initiative aimed at strengthening Europe’s space-based security and crisis response capabilities, which was oversubscribed with €166.63 million pledged against a €100 million envelope. This represents an oversubscription of approximately 66%.
In contrast, the agency’s Human and Robotic Exploration budget, which ESA initially projected at €3.7 billion, experienced a significant undersubscription. ESA Member States committed just over €2.9 billion, a shortfall of more than 20%. While this figure is slightly higher than the previous three-year period, during which €2.7 billion in spending had been committed, an increase of €200 million is insufficient to even offset inflation, never mind expanding the agency’s plans for low Earth orbit, the Moon, and beyond.
Exploration, while having few commercial applications, is, arguably, the heart of ESA’s public identity. It is the programme through which the agency captures the public imagination, demonstrates technological ambition, and maintains Europe’s presence in human spaceflight and deep-space missions. And while Science is safe behind a legal wall, the cannibalisation of Exploration risks eroding the programme as a vehicle for scientific wonder and technological advancement.
Reprioritising funding, however, is not the only potential consequence of an increased focus on dual-use programmes. It may also blur the line between civilian and military assets, increasing the likelihood that such infrastructure is targeted. Recent events have already highlighted how quickly this distinction can break down in practice.
The SpaceX Starlink network, while commercially operated, has become integral to uninterrupted battlefield communications since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have used it extensively for everything from communications to drone operations. Russian units have also reportedly obtained and used Starlink terminals through third-party channels, although SpaceX has made considerable efforts to shut down Russia’s use of the network.
The use of Starlink on the battlefield also falls into a grey area under its terms of service. According to SpaceX founder Elon Musk, “Starlink terminals can be used for defense infrastructure communications, schools, hospitals, personal, etc, but terms of service do not allow for offensive military use.” Despite this, the use of Starlink on the battlefield has made it a target for Russian countermeasures, including cyber and electronic warfare efforts aimed at disrupting the network. This again underscores how quickly commercial systems can become contested assets once integrated into military operations.
The use of space assets in conflict is also far from exclusive to the Starlink network or the United States, with European space assets also having been targeted. In early February, the Financial Times reported that two Russian spacecraft had shadowed 17 European satellites in geostationary orbit. The report noted that these activities are suspected to be part of SIGINT operations, raising concerns about the potential compromise of sensitive information transmitted by these systems. Assets in orbit are, however, only part of the concern when it comes to infrastructure being targeted by malicious actors.
As Emma Gatti notes in the most recent SpaceNews Europe Report, earlier this month, a ground station in Israel owned and operated by the Luxembourg-based satellite provider SES was hit by a Hezbollah missile strike as part of recent hostilities in the Middle East. While the station was a commercial facility, Hezbollah reportedly identified it as a “Cyber Defense and Communications Division of the Israeli enemy army” and as such, fair game for targeting.
These incidents illustrate how quickly civilian space infrastructure can be drawn into conflict and treated as a legitimate target once it is perceived to serve security purposes. While there has been no indication that ESA-linked ground infrastructure would be targeted, such a scenario is far from implausible, as the agency continues to entangle itself in security matters through its Resilience, Navigation, and Connectivity Directorate and the European Resilience from Space programme.
Is ESA the right agency for the job?
At this moment in time, there is no parallel for ESA in terms of its size, technical expertise, and strategic position within Europe’s space sector.
CNES and DLR, the national agencies of France and Germany respectively, have significant technical expertise and established links to the defence sector. However, both agencies operate within national mandates, meaning their influence and authority extend no further than their own borders. Coordinating Europe-wide defence programmes through either agency would require a level of cross-border political alignment that neither is structurally positioned to deliver.
The European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA), founded in 2021, has a comparable potential reach to ESA and has a mandate to ensure the security and safety of the European Union. The agency does, however, have very little to no technical expertise, relying on ESA for the implementation of all of its flagship programmes, including Copernicus, Galileo, and future IRIS2 programmes. EUSPA acts as an operational body and as an administrative vehicle for delivering on the EU Space Programme. It could build out its technical expertise, but that would come at considerable cost, both financially and in terms of the time required to develop such capabilities.
It may be that there isn’t an alternative. It may be that ESA is absolutely pivotal for the development of what is becoming increasingly vital European-wide defence capabilities. However, as the importance of these systems grows, their share of ESA’s attention will increase, and it is difficult to see a scenario in which this does not affect programmes such as Human and Robotic Exploration, which do not benefit from the same funding guarantees as the Science programme. There is something worth mourning in that prospect. The missions that ask not what space can do for Europe’s security but what it can tell us about our place in the universe may find themselves increasingly difficult to justify in a funding environment defined by urgency and utility. I want to live in a Europe that continues to look up in wonder rather than over its shoulder.
